Middle East experts discuss what’s behind the escalating Israel-Hezbollah conflict

To discuss the spiraling violence between Israel and Lebanon, Geoff Bennett spoke with Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a longtime State Department official in both Democratic and Republican administrations, and Hussein Ibish, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.
Geoff Bennett:
For perspective on the spiraling violence between Israel and Lebanon, we get two views.
Aaron David Miller is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a longtime State Department official in both Democratic and Republican administrations. And Hussein Ibish is a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.
Thank you both for being here.
Hussein, I will start with you.
Lebanon’s Health Ministry says the strikes have killed 492 people, including 35 children and 58 women. What’s your assessment of how Israel is conducting this military operation?
Hussein Ibish, Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute:
Well, it’s obviously aimed at not just Hezbollah and its weapons depots, but anything that Israel thinks might be of use to Hezbollah. It’s very similar to the doctrine applied in Gaza, where dual-use, triple-use facilities are all targeted, and so are anything that could kind of maybe be on that list.
There is a real deference towards authorization rather than non-authorization of strikes and a willingness to do tremendous harm. Part of it is psychological warfare. Part of it is generalized vengeance. Israel’s approach to these things is wars between societies, and they want to make sure everybody gets the point and everybody suffers.
Geoff Bennett:
Aaron David Miller, how does this move Israel closer to its goal of facilitating the return of some 60,000 people, civilians to their homes in the north?
Aaron David Miller, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: You know, it’s great to be with you. And it’s always great to be with Hussein.
I’m not sure about the war against societies. So I think the Israelis are faced with a legitimate problem, and that is, October 8, Hezbollah decided, for their own reasons, perhaps encouraged by Iran, to become part of the Axis of Resistance. And in doing so, they struck Israel.
We have been living on borrowed time ever since. And Hezbollah understands that it’s — like Hamas, it’s placed the entire population of Lebanon in the dock for its actions.
As far as Israel’s strategy, I mean, I do raise a concern. I’m not sure the Israelis believe for a minute, frankly, that all this military pressure is going to get to somehow roll over, let alone create a pathway that the Biden administration would very eagerly take advantage of to de-escalate under the able and very talented management of Amos Hochstein, who negotiated a maritime border with — two years ago, with — under — with Hamas’ and presumably with Iran’s acquiescence.
I think the Israelis, frankly — I don’t think they want a major escalation, which is going to expose their population centers and infrastructure to an enormous amount of destruction. But they are taking a major whack at Hezbollah.
I think they’re prepared to continue that, perhaps even without a sustainable objective.
Geoff Bennett:
Do you expect Israel to launch a ground operation in Southern Lebanon?
Hussein Ibish:
Not yet.
I mean, I do think that, yes, Hezbollah is responsible, for sure, for dragging yet again Lebanon and its people into a conflict which is not connected to Lebanese interests. But that’s changed now with the pager explosion, et cetera. I think there were all over 4,000 bombs randomly put all over Lebanon, killed a lot of people, including children.
I think the perspective of a lot of Lebanese has shifted to be more synthetic to Hezbollah. I think that a land invasion is not yet likely. But Israel may come to find that it cannot create the illusion of security, because that’s what they’re chasing.
And none of this, not the bombing, not some kind of a security barrier they might try to create by seizing and creating a new occupation in a swathe of Southern Lebanon, none of it would provide security for Northern Israel.
In fact, it would mire Israel in yet another open-ended occupation and conflict counterinsurgency in the north, as well as in the south. But I do think that it could create, for a short period of time, the illusion of security. And I think it’s possible that the Israelis may turn to that, if they cannot get the illusion of security through this bombing, which is undoubtedly a form of coercive diplomacy.
Clearly, they’re trying to force Hezbollah into some kind of formal back-down, while degrading their rockets and rocket launchers. But none of that translates into greater security for Northern Israel. At most, it buys you time.
Geoff Bennett:
Aaron David Miller, what about Iran? You say neither Israel nor Iran wants a full-blown direct conflict. But how might this escalation by Israel into Lebanon, how might this prompt Iran to be more provocative in response?
Aaron David Miller:
Well, if in fact you actually got a major escalation, Hezbollah has not yet crossed the key red line, which is the use of their precision-guided missiles again, which they have hundreds, not thousands, but, nonetheless, they have sufficient quantity in order to do tremendous damage to Israeli population centers, infrastructure, the electricity grid.
I mean, Israel gets a lot of its water from desal plants. Those would go out. This could become a major nightmare. And, remember, Hezbollah has the capacity now to launch 3,000 missiles a day. In summer of 2006, in the 34-day war, they launched 3,000 during the entire campaign.
Look, the Iranians, I think, want to cause the Israelis as much difficulty as they can. They’d love to see an Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. They’d love to see the Israelis in the West Bank and in Gaza in perpetuity.
But what they don’t want to see is an Israeli and/or American strike against Iran proper. And you could end up in — with that eventuality if, in fact, you have got a major Israeli-Hezbollah escalation, and Iran felt the need to come to Hezbollah’s defense. Israelis and perhaps even the Americans could get involved.
And you could see something the Middle East has never experienced before, which is a multifront war, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Iran. The Houthis (AUDIO GAP) got really bad and Iranians striking oil targets in the Gulf, which, as we know, they have done in 2019.
Geoff Bennett:
Yes.
What does de-escalation look like at this point, and what more can the U.S. do, if anything?
Hussein Ibish:
I think the U.S. could do a lot to restrain Israel, because Israel has achieved early on in this conflict that began right after October 7 escalation dominance.
They made it clear very early on, and especially during this year, that they don’t mind a broader war that Aaron has described, that of all the parties involved, other than Hamas, which has no ability to influence things really, that Israel is the one that is most interested in a potential war, that they wouldn’t mind getting the United States to actually bomb Iranian nuclear facilities through the process Aaron just described.
There are a lot of people in Israel who are enthusiastic about that, and a bigger number in the Israeli government who are ambivalent about it. They’re concerned about it, but, at the same time, they can see upsides, which is why they have been so reckless and so escalatory in recent months.
De-escalation looks like Hezbollah backing off with rocket attacks and making maybe some conciliatory noises about decoupling their conflict with Israel from the war in Gaza, which is the one thing they have been harping on, is that they won’t change any of their behavior until there’s a cease-fire in Gaza.
That doesn’t actually make any sense from their point of view, except sort of in a very vague, ideological way. And it also certainly means the United States restraining Israel. I think both Tehran and Washington, who would say, and I think with good reason, they don’t want a broader war, have a big responsibility to restrain their allies.
And, in particular, I think Washington really does need to say to the Israelis in a more open way, if you force a war here, because you are the party driving it this time — it wasn’t true in 2006, but now it is — we — you’re going to be on your own. We — don’t rely on us at the U.N. for more munitions or anything.
Our policy has been that the war should not spread. And if it spreads because you insist it must spread for whatever reason, then we’re not responsible.
Geoff Bennett:
Aaron, in the 30 seconds we have left, is there anything that President Biden could say to Bibi Netanyahu at the U.N. General Assembly this week that might make a difference?
Aaron David Miller:
Yes, I will make this brief.
In 11 months, the administration, for any number of reasons, some legitimate, some perhaps not, has been reluctant and/or refused to impose a single cost or consequence that normal humans, like the three of us, would regard as sustained and serious pressure.
Fifty — are we 50 days out from November 5? There is absolutely no way, in my judgment, given the consequential nature of this election, that this administration, with Iran perceived to be pulling the strings, even though it may want de-escalation — Hezbollah is an Iranian proxy — is going to pressure the Israelis in the 50-plus days that remain before this very consequential election.
Hussein Ibish:
And the Israelis know this and are cynically using that situation, rather, to give themselves a freer hand.
Geoff Bennett:
Hussein Ibish and Aaron David Miller, we thank you both for your insights and for your time this evening.
Hussein Ibish:
Thank you.
Aaron David Miller:
Thanks for having us.